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Abstract
Since Tversky's (1977) seminal investigation, the triangle inequality, along with symmetry and minimality, have had a central role in investigations of the fundamental constraints on human similarity judgments. The meaning of minimality and symmetry in similarity judgments has been straightforward, but this is not the case for the triangle inequality. Expressed in terms of dissimilarities, and assuming a simple, linear function between dissimilarities and distances, the triangle inequality constraint implies that human behaviour should be consistent with Dissimilarity(A,B) + Dissimilarity(B,C) ≥ Dissimilarity(A,C), where A, B, and C are any three stimuli. We show how we can translate this constraint into one for similarities, using Shepard's (1987) generalization law, and so derive the multiplicative triangle inequality for similarities,
) where ( ) . Can Tversky's (1977) famous work is widely interpreted as showing that similarity judgments are not consistent with the metric axioms, thus casting a critical eye on the widespread approach to representation and similarity based on psychological spaces (for earlier examination see Attneave, 1950 , Rosch, 1975 . Specifically, all distances must obey the metric axioms: If we employ distances in psychological spaces to model similarities, should it not be the case that similarities need be consistent with the metric axioms? Then, the common interpretation of Tversky's work is that models of similarity based on distances cannot be adequate.
Introduction
This interpretation is correct for symmetry and minimality (that the similarity between an item and itself should be maximal and that similarities should be symmetric). However, in fact, Tversky (1977) provided only a much weaker argument regarding the triangle inequality and similarities. He discussed the triangle inequality in relation to a famous example, based on William James. Tversky noted (p.329) "the perceived distance of Jamaica to Russia exceeds the perceived distance of Jamaica to Cuba, plus that of Cuba to Russia -contrary to the triangle inequality." If we equate distances with (some simple function of) dissimilarities, the triangle inequality constraint for these countries can be written as
Jamaica and Russia are highly dissimilar to each other, while Jamaica and Cuba have a very low dissimilarity (because of geographical location) and likewise for Cuba and Russia (because of political affiliation), so violating the triangle inequality -for dissimilarities. In both the original paper and a subsequent one (Tversky & Gati, 1982) Tversky is extremely careful to limit the scope of this conclusion. For example, he said (Tversky, 1977, p.329 ) "…the triangle inequality implies that if a is quite similar to b, and b is quite similar to c, then a and c cannot be very dissimilar from each other. Thus, it sets a lower limit to the similarity between a and c in terms of the similarities between a and b and between b and c." But, this expression is not a quantitative constraint.
Thus, despite the fact that Tversky's work was nearly 40 years ago, there is currently no precise notion of how the triangle inequality translates into a constraint for similarities, as opposed to dissimilarities. Resolving this problem is important both for studies into the foundations of human similarity judgments and, more practically, since the majority of psychological research has focused on similarity, not dissimilarity (e.g., Medin et al., 1990; Minda & Smith, 2001; Nosofsky, 1984; Pothos, 2005) .
Why is it not possible to just assume a violation of triangle inequalities and reexpress it in terms of similarities? One might be inclined to write a triangle inequality with similarities as
measures may not have a simple inverse relation (Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1990) , but this possibility is beyond this study.
The most widely adopted function linking distances and similarities is Shepard's (1987) law of generalization, according to which . Shepard's law is still very much at the heart of influential cognitive theories, such as Nosofsky's (1984) Generalized Context Model or the Minda-Smith version of prototype theory (Minda & Smith, 2001 ). Shepard's law assumes that similarity is a ratio scale between 0, 1. While this seems like a strong assumption (e.g., Tversky & Gati, 1982 , focused on ordinal relations), note that most empirical similarity measures are based on Likert scales.
When using a Likert scale, a common (if not sometimes tacit) assumption is that such scales are linear and so correspond to interval, possibly ratio, scales. For example, naïve observers are able to make fine discriminations of similarity. Moreover, accepting that there are pairs of stimuli that have zero psychological similarity indicates a ratio scale for psychological similarity. It is possible to question this assumption of linearity, which would undermine the present discussion. However, the present authors are not aware of any evidence against linearity and hypothetical arguments to the contrary appear contrived.
We can use Shepard's (1987) law to derive a constraint for similarities, from the triangle inequality:
which gives:
We call this latter inequality the multiplicative triangle inequality (MTI) and it indicates that, if we consider the similarity of two stimuli (A,C) to a third one (B), then the product of the similarities to the third one provides a lower bound for the similarity of the two initial stimuli. For example, for three objects, table, chair and bed, the lower bound for the similarity between a table and a chair is the product of the similarities between table and bed and chair and bed. As far as we know, the MTI is a unique proposal for how human similarity judgments are constrained, it is the most straightforward way to derive a constraint on similarities from the triangle inequality, and it has not been empirically investigated before (we further justify this last comment shortly below)
Note, the literature has also considered similarity functions using a Gaussian, rather than exponential form. However, according to Nosofsky (1992) , the Gaussian similarity function applies with "protracted identification training involving asymptotic performance with highly confusable stimuli" (p.29). With a Gaussian similarity function, we have: Tversky & Gati, 1982) . There are some reports in the literature which may look like relevant evidence, but this is not the case. For example, Voorspoels et al. (2011) , as part of a similarity study, reported on violations of the triangle inequality. But, they derived a similarity matrix based on feature vectors and it is possible that the situation regarding the triangle inequality/ MTI would be different with direct similarity ratings. Also, the highest rate of triangle inequality violations was 0.13%, which indicates, if anything, no violations.
Second, regarding theoretical accounts, there have been several influential similarity proposals, notably from Krumhansl (1978) and Ashby and Perrin (1988) , which all purport to cover Tversky's (1977) key findings, including violations of the triangle inequality. So, exactly how theoretically pertinent is it to still research the triangle inequality (or the MTI)? Is it not the case that, across a research tradition spanning several decades, we now have several satisfactory similarity theories?
Both Krumhansl's (1978) and Ashby and Perrin's (1988) theories, for all their significant overall contributions to our understanding of similarity, actually provide a poor account of violations of the triangle inequality. Krumhansl's (1978) explanation for the triangle inequality is based on the idea that similarity judgments emphasize dimensions and features that objects have in common. As a result, stimuli which are far apart in an overall psychological space may be close to each other in a low dimensionality subspace, corresponding to the common dimensions between the stimuli. For example, Russia and Cuba are similar in the subspace of Communism, which corresponds to their common dimension. Krumhansl (1978, p.12 ) notes "Subspaces defined by obvious stimulus dimensions would seem to be likelier projections than subspaces not corresponding to such dimensions" and goes on to observe that such a scheme may be able to account for similarity relations inconsistent with the triangle inequality. But, why should similarity be assessed in a subspace for the triangle inequality comparisons and not in other cases? Krumhansl's model does not provide any guidance as to when similarity should be assessed in subspaces or the way to determine the relevant subspaces.
Regarding Ashby and Perrin (1988) , they showed how one can manipulate the perceptual effects distributions, so that two stimuli can be both dissimilar to each other and both similar to a third stimulus, hence violating the triangle inequality. Such a situation can be mapped to Tversky's (1977) Russia-Cuba-Jamaica example. However, this argument assumes (see their Figure 4 , p.133) asymmetric and inequivalent perceptual effects distributions for the three stimuli. This is an unlikely assumption in the case of, for example, comparisons between Russia, Cuba, and Jamaica. Why would the distributions for such countries have a different shape?
Note, finally, that Nosofsky's (1984) influential Generalized Context Model can produce violations of the triangle inequality, through manipulations of its attentional parameters. But, without an independent way to predict the setting of the attentional weights, this is a post hoc explanation. An analogous argument applies to Tversky's (1977) own contrast model, which relies on parameter setting to accommodate violations of the metric axioms (though note again that, regarding the triangle inequality on similarities, no direct demonstration or model fit was offered by Tversky, 1977) .
There other less well-known accounts, that are potentially relevant. For example, Jaekel et al. 's (2008) proposal of similarity metrics, based on a Hilbert space (a kind of vector space) and Shepard's (1987) generalization law, can produce violations of the triangle inequality, though the concurrent coverage of violations of symmetry and minimality is unclear (all the other similarity accounts considered here aim for a comprehensive coverage of Tversky's, 1977, key results) . Overall, it is a misleading impression that violations of the triangle inequality can be straightforwardly explained by dominant similarity approaches, which makes it unlikely that they can produce violations of the MTI in a satisfactory way too.
Recently, we proposed a similarity model based on the mathematics of quantum theory (QT), specifically so as to account for Tversky's (1977) key findings as naturally as possibly . In fact, this similarity approach can naturally cover putative violations of the MTI (and the triangle inequality, if one considers dissimilarities). That this is the case can be explained fairly directly, without detailed modelling. We note that this does not preclude that other similarity approaches may be extended to cover putative violations of the MTI in a natural way, though, the corresponding detailed argument is beyond this paper.
QT provides rules for assigning probabilities to events, from quantum mechanics, without the physics. Some researchers have been pursuing QT cognitive models, especially for behaviors at odds with the more established classical probability theory (Aerts & Aerts, 1995; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2011; Haven & Khrennikov, 2013 The more important point is that a prediction of MTI violation for Tversky's (1977) follows. However, it needs be pointed out that perhaps, ideally, empirical similarity data would be used to derive a representation (along the lines of that in Figure 1 ). and then examine directly (without further fits) whether the MTI is violated or not.
Unfortunately, the QT similarity program is not at this point yet. The problem is that we do not know how to determine the optimal dimensionality for the subspace corresponding to each concept (in the above example they are all rays); this is an important objective for future work.
Communi sm i n t h e C a r i b b e a n Russia Cuba Jamaica Overall, Tversky's (1977) Jamaica, Cuba, Russia example makes it fairly plausible that violations of the MTI will be observed in similarity judgments. However, it is impossible to establish this without detailed measurements. If similarity judgments are mostly consistent with the MTI, then this would make suspect the QT similarity approach and force us to rethink the motivation for the model. To anticipate our results, this is not the case.
Participants, materials, and methods
We tested 431 experimentally naïve participants, recruited through CrowdFlower, for a small payment ($1; due to a computer error, the payment was not administered correctly and we could only manually pay participants who got in touch with us. The payment error manifested itself after the experimental tasks). The sample size was a priori set to 400 participants, but the recruitment process (automated through CrowdFlower) overshot. Participants were randomly divided between two conditions, which employed different stimuli.
We constructed two lists of stimulus triplets, one consisting of 19 country triplets and another consisting of 21 general stimulus triplets (Appendix 1). The triplets were constructed so that two pairs of stimuli were expected to lead to a high similarity while the third pair would have low similarity, e.g., for countries, Mexico, USA, Canada and for general stimuli Razor, Knife, Fork, but no piloting was carried out, since we were not intending detailed modelling. Participants were randomly assigned either to the countries or the general stimuli.
To assess putative MTI violations for each triplet, we required three similarity ratings, so that for the countries stimuli there were overall 57 similarity ratings and for the general stimuli 63; in both cases, participants performed the ratings in a random order. Each trial involved showing the two stimuli concurrently on a screen, with the prompt to rate their similarity on a 1-9 scale. The stimuli remained on the screen until a response was provided.
Results
For each participant we computed the variance of all their similarity judgments and removed participants with either very high (e.g., participants using only 1 or 9) or very low (participants not using the full scale) variances. Cutoffs for high, low variance were 10, 0.7 respectively. This procedure retained 191 out of 212 participants for the countries stimuli, and 197 out of 219 for the general stimuli. Similarity ratings for the remaining participants were then converted via a linear rescaling to a 0 to 1 scale, since, recall, similarities in the MTI were derived using Shepard's (1987) generalization law and so bounded by 0,1.
There are two subtle issues which affect the analysis of results. First, a violation of the MTI occurs when ( ) ( ) ( ). Recall, the empirical procedure involved triplets of items, A, B, C, for which we collected empirical data for all pairwise similarities. For each triplet, we could identify the lowest similarity and so seek putative MTI violations. However, this procedure is inappropriate and would simply increase Type I errors, since for each triplet the stimuli A, B, C were specifically selected so that one similarity would be low and the other two similarities higher. So, we tested for violations of the MTI just in terms of which pairwise similarity was expected to be lower than the other two (note, the relationships between the A, B, C stimuli are obvious; see Appendix 1). Second, the MTI as a constraint on similarity judgments makes most sense when a consistent/ fixed order is employed throughout all relevant pairwise comparisons and this is the approach we adopted (with future work we will explore the implications from possible violations of symmetry).
We first considered the reliability of the data, using a measure of MTI violation (since the MTI states that ( ) ( ) ( ) we computed ( ) ( ) ( ), which will be negative if the MTI is violated). This reliability analysis indicates whether participants consistently produce a greater level of violations of the MTI for some triplets of stimuli than for others. For the countries and general stimuli Cronbach's alpha was .70 (N=191) and .84 (N=197), respectively. The materials, therefore, differed in the degree to which they consistently showed possible violations of the MTI (see also Figure 2 ).
The null hypothesis is that the MTI is a psychological constraint, so that similarity judgments will always be consistent with the MTI, excluding the possibility of random variation in ratings. Thus, for each triplet, there is a possibility that a violation of the MTI will be observed by chance. To compute this chance probability, we considered all possible combinations of 1-9 similarity ratings, for each triplet (converted to a 0,1 scale), and counted the percentage of triplets in which an MTI violation was observed: this was 25%. This is a conservative estimate of random error, since, given a null hypothesis that similarity judgments are always consistent with the MTI, we still assume a rate of by chance MTI violation for any triplet of ¼. Note also that in considering a triplet, ( ) ( ) ( ), the three similarities are not completely independent. However, when considering correlations between triplet similarities, the random error rate is reduced. We can see this by noting that the MTI is not violated when the three similarities are equal or when ( ) is equal to one of the other two similarities. Instead, MTI violations occur when there is a mismatch between the similarities, with ( ) small but the other two large. Thus, if anything, the effect of taking into account correlations would be to make it easier to reject the null hypothesis.
We conducted an item-based analysis, testing that the proportion of MTI violations for a given triplet was higher than the 25% error rate expected by chance (participants were treated as a random effect). Note, there are no expectations as to whether the MTI is consistently violated in a set of items. Instead, the null hypothesis is that the MTI is a psychological constraint and rejecting the null hypothesis involves existence proof that there are some items for which the MTI is violated. The MTI violation count for each triplet was based on when (
, where A,C was the pair of stimuli assumed a priori to be most similar. Using a dependent variable based on binary counts (for each triplet, for each participant, checking whether the MTI was violated or not) is justified because the distribution of Fisher's Exact Probability Test on one degree of freedom).
One possible issue with the analysis above is that some ratings of the similarity between stimuli make an MTI violation impossible. For example, if a participant rates the similarity between A and B as 1 out of 9, this implies ( ) , and a violation of the MTI is now impossible whatever the other two similarities. To investigate this we reanalyzed the data, ignoring, for a given triplet of stimuli, responses of 1 for the A,B or B,C similarities (which would lead to a converted similarity of 0, making an MTI violation impossible). This approach changes the frequency of observed MTI violations, reduces the sample size for each triplet of stimuli (because of the eliminated responses; the range of responses for each triplet is now 64-179), and increases the expected rate of obtaining MTI violations by chance from 25% to 33%, for a given triplet. For the general stimuli, the rate of violations (14/21) was still significantly higher than the chance 1/20 rate (p<.0005) but for the countries stimuli (3/19) it was now not significantly different from the chance rate ( p=.067). This gives us confidence that an overall conclusion of MTI violations, in some cases, is independent of the precise way we analyze the data. Tversky's (1977) seminal influence was that he started a research programme into the algebraic foundations of similarity judgments and, indeed, most major subsequent similarity proposals are often tested against his key empirical conclusions regarding violations of the metric axioms. However, we showed that implications for similarity from the triangle inequality have not been worked out and require a commitment to a function linking distance and similarity. Another seminal influence in psychology, Shepard's (1987) generalization law, was used for this purpose. We thus derived the MTI and, in one experiment, provided an existence proof that the MTI is sometimes violated in similarity judgments. Note, our results offer no guidance as to what might be the proportion of MTI violations, if one were to select a triplet of items randomly, that is, we currently cannot provide guidance into the manipulations which may make violations of the MTI more or less likely (contrast with e.g. Aguilar and Medin, 1999, in relation to symmetry) All the stimuli were selected with an expectation that violations of the MTI may be 'likely' and so, if one were to cast a critical eye on our results, one could say that the evidence for the preponderance of MTI violations in human similarity judgments is not strong. However, as Tversky (1977) intended in his original discussion, our results do provide clear existence proof that the MTI can be violated sometimes.
Discussion and conclusions
A researcher insisting on conceptualizing similarity as a function of distance may explore alternative functions linking similarity and distance, such as a Gaussian function. However, violations of the exponential MTI version, for stimuli as the ones employed in this study will still need to be explained or, alternatively, a Gaussian similarity function will need to be motivated more strongly for all kinds of stimuli. This latter possibility is inconsistent with the available evidence (Nosofsky, 1992) , though note the issue of exponential vs. Gaussian similarity functions has not attracted much attention recently (indeed some researchers use a free parameter corresponding to the exact form of the similarity function). An alternative approach might be to adopt Nosofsky's (1984 Nosofsky's ( , 1992 formalization, which offers parametric flexibility to accommodate both MTI violations and violations of the other metric axioms (such as symmetry, using a directionality parameter). While there is no doubt that his theory is one of the most influential categorization theories, it is arguable as to whether similarity researchers will be satisfied with this approach, unless parametric changes can be motivated independently; currently this is not possible.
Our motivation for pursuing this research was exactly because of its potential to provide results which are particularly easy to accommodate within the QT similarity model . We interpret violations of the MTI inequality as additional support for the QT similarity model, while of course acknowledging that this is a vast research topic that cannot be settled by any single study. In brief, the psychological explanation for how violations of the MTI arise from the QT similarity model relates is exactly this contextuality that is characteristic of the QT similarity model (and QT models in general) that provides a natural interpretation of this and related similarity findings (such as the diagnosticity effect, which Tversky, 1977, also reported) . Note, as the number of possible stimuli increases, it is likely that a pattern of similarity relations of a certain complexity will constraint the minimum dimensionality of the corresponding QT space; this is an interesting topic for future work.
In closing, understanding the formal properties of similarity judgments is a key objective not only in cognitive science (since similarity is often the building block of cognitive models; Goldstone & Son, 2005; Pothos, 2005; Sloman & Rips, 1998 ; see also Gärdenfors, 2000) , but beyond too. For example, in information retrieval, most models are based on vector spaces (e.g., Salton et al., 1975) , and the corresponding ranking algorithms are either obviously consistent with the metric axioms or a detailed assessment is not made (e.g., Manning et al., 2009; Robertson & Spärck Jones, 1976) .
Similar considerations apply to e.g. latent semantic analysis (e.g., Dumais, 2004) . In presenting these results, we hope to provide an important technical modification in our understanding of violations of the triangle inequality and, in addition, a further source of evidence concerning the QT similarity model. 
